Embedded Files
Two New Public Comments
June 6, 2026
Last week, Animal Counsel submitted two public comments to the federal government.
The first comment, written by Co-Founders Shelby White and Aidan Bodeo-Lomicky, covers Colorado’s gray wolf reintroduction program and suggests ways to ameliorate dangerous wolf-livestock conflicts.
The second comment, written by volunteer Soleil Gaylord, responds to the potential removal of vessel speed reduction zones for the North Atlantic right whale off the East Coast.
Read the comments here:
🐺: https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FWS-R6-ES-2026-0958-1074
🐋: https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NOAA-NMFS-2026-0364-29715
And if you'd like to sign up for our Regulation Tracker so you can submit your own comments on rules like these, click here.
Announcing Our Regulation Tracker!
May 25, 2026
Every month, the federal government proposes dozens of regulations affecting animals—and until now, there's been no easy way to keep track of them for commenting purposes. That's why we're so excited to announce our all-new Regulation Tracker.
How it works: you enter your email address in the form linked below, and then we send you a weekly update of all the animal-related proposed regulations that are open for comment. We hope this project brings more attention and public input to the variety of wild and domestic animal-related rules being proposed each week. Every comment matters!
Sign up here: Regulation Tracker
Gunnison Sage-Grouse Video Feature
May 20, 2026
Check out this fantastic and informative short documentary by Zack Mitchell, a student at Western Colorado University (featuring Co-Founder Mason Liddell and CLALDF alum James Malis!). The video focuses on the Gunnison sage-grouse, an ESA-listed species found only in southwestern Colorado and the extreme eastern portion of Utah. This species exclusively relies on this region's sagebrush ecosystem, a habitat under severe threat due to livestock grazing, development, and fossil fuel drilling.
To see some familiar faces and incredible mating displays, click here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zbhC8LV1Phk
Harassment on Exhibition: Proposing an Amendment to the Endangered Species Act for Endangered Captive Wildlife
May 18, 2026
This is a condensed version of Isabella's longer paper set to be published in USF Law Review Vol. 60, Issue 2.
For animal advocates, a household name can manifest itself in icons like Ingrid Newkirk and Joyce Tischler. However, the same is true for Tilikum the orca and Happy the Asian elephant.
Tilikum was captured from his ocean home as a calf in the 1980s and sold to SeaWorld, where he spent the rest of his life performing tricks for crowds while suffering in his small concrete tank. Happy was taken from the wilds of Thailand as a calf in the 1970s and brought to the United States, where she has been held in isolation in her small one-acre enclosure at the Bronx Zoo. Both Tilikum and Happy have made headlines over the years with news stories detailing the poor nature of their captivity and their behavioral declines. These captive animals’ stories compelled and informed not only animal advocates and animal lawyers, but the public as well.
Although millions of animals are exploited in the United States every year, Tilikum and Happy are particularly puzzling. Whereas farmed chickens or fish have almost no legal protections, Tilikum and Happy, as an orca and Asian elephant respectively, are protected by one of the most robust federal legal frameworks for animal protection in the United States: the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
So, how is it that Tilikum the orca spent his short life circling a chlorinated concrete pool, with a collapsed dorsal fin (indicating physical and mental deterioration)? And how is it that Happy, a social mammal meant to walk several miles a day in the wild, has been held in isolation for two decades without sufficient space to roam and graze? While no animal should suffer in cruel confinement, these animal’s unique classification as endangered wildlife with purported elevated protection makes their suffering that much more distressing.
The Endangered Species Act & The Animal Welfare Act
The ESA was passed by Congress in 1973 to protect endangered animals. According to the ESA, it is unlawful to “take” any listed species within the United States, with take statutorily defined as to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.” These definitions are applied uniformly to both wild and captive members of endangered species, except for one: harassment.
The Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") defines harass as "an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering." Captive wildlife, like Tilikum and Happy, are confined in such a way that limits their natural behaviors such as swimming or walking great distances, hunting or grazing, and socializing with their pod or herd. These restrictions often cause captive wildlife to be plagued by stress, anxiety, and abnormal behaviors, often referred to as "zoochosis." Zoochosis is "psychosis caused by confinement," evidenced by repetitive movements and pacing, which can also lead to physical injuries such as self-mutilation. Therefore, captive wildlife confined in zoos often suffer from injuries that result from annoying the animals to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns.
The regulatory definition of harass also states the following:
. . . when applied to captive wildlife, [harass] does not include generally accepted: (1) Animal husbandry practices that meet or exceed the minimum standards for facilities and care under the Animal Welfare Act, (2) Breeding procedures, or (3) Provisions of veterinary care for confining, tranquilizing, or anesthetizing, when such practices, procedures, or provisions are not likely to result in injury to the wildlife.
Significantly, as long as exhibitors of captive endangered wildlife, such as zoos, satisfy standards set by the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) that are “generally accepted,” they can lawfully engage in behavior that would normally be considered harassment if the animal was in the wild. None of the other take definitions have a distinction or an exception for captive members of the endangered species like the above for harassment. This distinction caters towards zoos as recreational business entities and disregards the legal protections that endangered animals are due, captive or not.
Generally, the AWA provides minimum standards for the maintenance of captive wildlife concerning housing, feeding and watering, sanitation, veterinary care, shelter, and handling. However, the AWA does not currently establish welfare standards that consider psychological well-being. As mentioned above, the lack of consideration for psychological well-being leads to zoochosis and injury.
Litigation
There are two primary cases that discuss the application of harassment to endangered captive wildlife. In Hill v. Coggins, 867 F.3d 499, 502–03 (4th Cir. 2017), the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging that the Cherokee Bear Zoo in North Carolina had unlawfully taken endangered grizzly bears after visiting the zoo and observing the bears in subpar conditions. The bears were observed listlessly pacing around concrete and unshaded pits as visitors threw food scraps into the "enclosure." The bears had no vegetation or stimulation in the pits.
The district court found that the zoo had not taken the bears under the ESA because the zoo had complied with the minimum requirements of the AWA. The plaintiffs argued that in addition to being AWA compliant, the zoo's maintenance of the endangered bears also had to "generally accepted." The Fourth Circuit reversed and agreed with the plaintiffs' interpretation that the zoo’s husbandry practices had to be both generally accepted and AWA compliant. However, on remand, the court ultimately found that the zoo had not violated the ESA through harassment because the court could not determine what qualified as "generally accepted husbandry practices" for grizzly bears.
The plaintiffs pointed to the accreditation standards of the Association of Zoos and Aquariums ("AZA"), an organization that has developed voluntary accreditation standards for the welfare of captive wildlife, including considerations for psychological well-being. Because less than 10% of licensed exhibitors are accredited by the AZA, the court could not conclude that the accreditation standards were generally accepted. Without a clear definition of “generally accepted husbandry practices,” that requirement was essentially toothless, and the court did not conclude that the bears were harassed.
In Kuehl v. Sellner, 887 F.3d 845, 858 (8th Cir. 2018), the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit successfully alleging that the Sellners, a couple who owned and operated Cricket Hollow Zoo in Iowa, had harassed captive wildlife at the zoo in violation of the ESA. The zoo housed approximately 300 animals, including endangered tigers and lemurs. The plaintiffs observed excessive feces and odors in animal enclosures, as well as a lack of enrichment for psychological well-being.
Despite being licensed, the facility was not AWA compliant. This consideration, combined with the egregiously unsanitary enclosures, led the court to find that the defendants had harassed the endangered species. Unlike in Hill v. Coggins, this court also found ESA violations due to a lack of enrichment and psychological well-being. Although psychological well-being is not a factor under the ESA, the AWA provides special consideration for the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates, such as lemurs. Because the social and mental needs of the lemurs were severely neglected at Cricket Hollow Zoo, the court found that the zoo had violated the ESA and harassed the lemurs.
The first case, Hill, demonstrates how insufficient the current harassment definition is at protecting endangered captive wildlife from poor treatment at zoos; without clear definitions, ESA violations cannot be determined. The second case demonstrates another failure of the current harassment definition: in Kuehl, the condition of the enclosures had to be egregious and the animal victims, as primates, had an elevated standard of care that included psychological well-being, which ultimately led to a finding of harassment.
The Amendment
Accordingly, the regulatory definition of harassment should be amended to better protect captive members of endangered species. Although the full paper dives more deeply into the changes that should be made, this blog post includes a snapshot of some factors that should be considered while amending the regulatory definition of harass.
Although zoos do not necessarily engage in the hunting, wounding, shooting, or killing of endangered species, the basic format of zoos necessitates a significant disruption of behaviors, which constitutes harassment. The harassment definition’s reliance on the AWA and nothing more is therefore highly deferential to zoos, because the confinement and social isolation inherent to zoos induces frustration and disruption of natural behaviors in captive animals.
While reference to the AWA should not be removed, it should not be the only factor considered for the harassment of endangered animals in zoos. As an example of why broadening the considerations is important, endangered cold-blooded species are not protected by the AWA. As a result, endangered snakes, lizards, and other cold-blooded species have no legal protection against harassment.
Additionally, zoos that exhibit any captive wildlife must maintain compliance with the AWA to remain licensed. While this is an imperfect system—noncompliance does not automatically result in the suspension of a license to exhibit—compliance with the AWA is already a general requirement to exhibit. Because the ESA offers higher levels of protection for endangered species, the harassment definition should do more than rely on the AWA. While the husbandry practices must also be generally accepted, the above discussion indicates that this supplemental requirement has no teeth. Therefore, the harassment definition should be amended to include other considerations aside from mere AWA compliance and generally accepted practices.
To establish a harassment definition that better suits the needs of endangered captive wildlife, the proposed regulatory definition should be informed by elevated welfare accreditation systems such as the AZA and Global Federation of Animal Sanctuaries ("GFAS"). Both systems of accreditation go beyond merely sanitation and wholesome food and water.
The AZA include guidelines on psychological well-being and enrichment, enclosure size and complexity, vegetation necessary for browsing and grazing, and time limits on interactions with ambassador animals. GFAS has developed "a set of 26 animal-specific and operations standards" developed by animal advocates, non-profit professionals, veterinarians, and sanctuary operators. The guidelines set by GFAS stress the importance of psychological well-being and discuss several forms of enrichment and attention to species-specific needs.
Of course, because AZA and GFAS are voluntary accreditation systems, the proposed amended harassment definition would not explicitly defer to these organizations. Rather, the proposed welfare standards for elevated protection of endangered captive wildlife can be informed and benefitted by the guidelines that are inclusive of psychological well-being.
The proposed harassment definition would retain its requirement that facilities must meet the minimum standards under the AWA but the reference to generally accepted practices should be removed due do the term’s ambiguity.
Rather, the definition should require elevated welfare and care standards for endangered captive wildlife (that are informed by AZA and GFAS), such as the following: (a) enclosures that are of a size and complexity sufficient to provide for the animal’s psychological well-being; and (b) implementation of enrichment programs, such as object enrichment, food enrichment, and species-specific social enrichment (social animals should not be held in isolation). However, just as with GFAS, veterinarians and advocates should be consulted on other guidelines to reduce the stress that endangered captive animals experience in captivity.
For a full discussion on why alternatives such as elimination between the captive-wild distinction would not be effective, please read the full-length paper.
You might be asking, why does this discussion only propose elevated welfare standards for endangered species and not other animals that are held captive in zoos? While an animal advocate’s dream would be for all animals in zoos to receive more legal protections (or for total liberation), the ESA covers various popular “zoo animals” that often happen to be endangered, such as lions, elephants, giraffes, and chimpanzees. This discussion homes in on cracks in an already established legal framework, which has the potential to relieve suffering a significant portion of animals in zoos.
Additionally, protection for endangered species has the potential to gain support from more than just animal advocates, but advocates in conservation as well. As members of an at-risk species that can be rehabilitated and further the species through reproduction, captive endangered species have conservation value. While the actual conservation benefits provided by zoos is debatable, zoos purport to serve conservation through captive breeding programs. Therefore, these facilities should doubly support the health and conservation value of their endangered animals.
Research shows that healthy animals contribute more to conservation programs such as captive breeding programs, and the stress captive wildlife currently experience in zoos adversely impacts health. Not only can increased stress reduce fertility and reproductive viability, but it may also lower the ability of a captive bred animal to be successfully rehabilitated.
By implementing elevated welfare standards for endangered wildlife—such as enrichment programs, species specific socialization, and enclosures with enough space and complexity—zoos will significantly reduce animal stress and consequently improve both their psychological and physical health as well as prevent reproductive failure.
Ultimately, animals protected by the ESA are intended to receive elevated legal protections. Both wild and captive members of endangered species receive the same protection for ESA take purposes, except in the context of harassment. This caters towards zoos as recreational businesses and dismisses the conservation value that endangered captive wildlife hold.
If zoos purport to confine endangered animals for conservation reasons, then those animals must receive stronger legal protections against the frustration and distress that are inherent to captivity. The regulatory definition of harass must be amended to better reflect the conservation value that captive endangered animals contain. In aligning with the legislative intent of the ESA, this amendment can also reduce significant suffering in many popular zoo animals and pave a path towards a more compassionate future, free of animal exploitation.
For a more robust argument and exploration of these topics, please read the full-length paper that is set to be published in USF Law Review Vol. 60, Issue 2:
Isabella Niven, Harassment on Exhibition: Proposing an Amendment to the Endangered Species Act for Endangered Captive Wildlife, 60 U.S.F. L. REV. (forthcoming publication).
Seeking Post-Grad Skadden/EJW Fellow!
May 11, 2026
Calling all rising 3Ls and incoming judicial law clerks! Animal Counsel is seeking a candidate to develop a paid, full-time Skadden and/or Equal Justice Works fellowship proposal with. If we are selected for funding, the fellowship will run from fall 2027 to fall 2029. We highly encourage our applicants to brainstorm animal law and policy projects that they are passionate about and include these ideas in your cover letters.
Please apply by emailing your cover letter, resume, and writing sample to contact@animalcounsel.org by June 18. We look forward to hearing from you!
Are Animals in Sanctuaries Free?
by Mason Liddell, Co-Founder*
April 20, 2026
What does it mean to pursue the right to liberty? Does it require an absolutist devotion, or can someone pursue their right to liberty without demanding complete and total freedom? In Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. Cheyenne Mountain Zoological Soc'y, 562 P.3d 63, 66 (Colo. 2025), the Colorado Supreme Court stated that the Nonhuman Rights Project (“NhRP”), which sought the transfer of five elephants from the Cheyenne Mountain Zoo to an elephant sanctuary, was “not actually seeking the right to liberty – that is, freedom from captivity – for the elephants.” In the Court’s words, without asking that the Zoo “open its gates and set the elephants loose to roam free in Colorado Springs and beyond,” the NhRP was not seeking liberty for the elephants. In this blog post, I want to challenge the idea that seeking liberty requires that you ask for absolute freedom for captive animals.
First, I invite you to simply think about the question yourself. Does it seem intuitively correct that one can only seek liberty if they do it maximally? For a brief thought experiment, imagine someone locked in a Hannibal Lecter-style mask and jacket. They’re put in a remote prison cell without the ability to pursue any interests beyond sitting and thinking. If that person asked to be put on house arrest with none of those same limitations, I would certainly say that they are pursuing their right to liberty. I would say the same if they asked for any restraint to be removed, even if they were not asking for every restraint to be removed and to have the cell door thrown wide open. Alternatively, think about your daily life. You may not be in captivity or imprisoned, but you still do not have absolute freedom of movement. Both you and an inmate have restricted freedom of movement to different degrees, while the inmate is limited by prison walls, and you are limited by property law and trespass. And so, even if an inmate petitioned for habeas to have the prison doors thrown open, nobody would counter that they are not seeking the right to liberty because they didn’t ask for the absolute right to go anywhere at any time. One is not entirely unfree while in confinement and then entirely free outside of confinement. It is clear, then, that seeking liberty by way of habeas is not a binary question. When an inmate uses habeas to pursue the right to liberty, they are asking for a difference of degree—the inmate is seeking more freedom than they presently have, not absolute and total freedom.
This intuition has been supported by courts in a number of cases. In People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 174 N.E.2d 725 (N.Y. App. 1961), an inmate sought release from a hospital dedicated to the custody of prisoners who had been declared insane. Instead, the inmate asked that he be returned to the prison where he began his incarceration. The court agreed that habeas was a viable mechanism for challenging his present location of incarceration without challenging his incarceration overall. This principle was upheld in People ex rel. Dawson v. Smith, 504 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. App. 1986), where the court agreed that Brown was a valid use of habeas because the inmate sought release from “an institution separate and different in nature from the correctional facility to which petitioner had been committed pursuant to the sentence of the court, and was not within the specific authorization conferred on the Department of Correctional Services by that sentence.” By contrast, the Dawson court also held that habeas was an inappropriate mechanism for seeking release from “confinement in a special housing unit” rather than the facility as a whole, especially when such confinement was authorized expressly by the Department of Correctional Services. Courts have similarly permitted the use of habeas to challenge the degree of restrictions on freedom in Miranda v. Reyes, 359 So. 3d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023) (allowing the use of habeas to challenge being in custody and seeking a return to house arrest), McGraw v. Wack, 632 N.Y.S.2d 135 (N.Y. App. 1995) (allowing the use of habeas to challenge detention in a mental hospital and seeking transfer to another institution), Perez v. Winn, 465 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Mass. 2006) (allowing the use of habeas to seek transfer from a Bureau of Prisons facility to a community corrections facility or a halfway house), and Jaworski v. Gutierrez, 509 F. Supp. 2d 573 (N.D.W. Va. 2007) (allowing the use of habeas to seek transfer from a Bureau of Prisons facility to a community corrections facility).
However, when the NhRP cited some of these cases demonstrating that habeas allows petitioners to seek lesser confinement rather than no confinement, the court still distinguished them. In dismissing the argument that habeas permits one to seek the transfer of a captive animal to a different form of captivity, the court in Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 54 N.Y.S.3d 392 (N.Y. App. 2017) concluded that the set of facts were more similar to those of Dawson than to those of Smith. However, the court did not explain that conclusion further or list the facts it found to be most comparable. Presumably, because the NhRP sought the transfer of these chimpanzees from individual human owners to a chimpanzee sanctuary, the court did not mean that the NhRP meant to transfer the chimpanzees to a different part of the same facility. Instead, it likely meant that the confinement of these chimpanzees was legal, as was the detention of the petitioner in Dawson.
Yet, this conclusion is irrelevant. Just because the confinement of the animals is legal does not mean that habeas is an inappropriate procedural mechanism. Even if it were entirely true that habeas petitioners cannot win a transfer to another facility, it would not follow that habeas is entirely unavailable to them, only that it is the incorrect vehicle to bring such a request. In short, the fact that a petitioner seeks transfer instead of release is reason to deny the petitioner’s petition, not to deny their ability to petition. In fact, the Lavery court appears to agree; its analysis comparing the facts of the chimpanzees’ case to the facts of Dawson comes only after the court says expressly that, for the sake of argument, it is assuming that habeas relief is potentially available to chimpanzees.
So why did the Colorado Supreme Court in Cheyenne Mountain Zoo conclude that the fact that the NhRP sought the transfer of five elephants to an elephant sanctuary is a reason to deny the elephants access to habeas entirely rather than a reason to, at most, deny a habeas petition? My honest answer is that I’m not sure. Likely, this argument was simply an afterthought—it is dealt with in a single paragraph at the end of fifteen-page opinion, with the real focus remaining on whether elephants qualified as “persons” for the purposes of the Colorado habeas statute. But the idea that the NhRP, in asking the courts to transfer animals from zoos to sanctuaries—one form of confinement to another—is somehow not “actually seeking the right to liberty” is not only intuitively incorrect, it is a conclusion that other courts across the country have roundly rejected. Doubly so given that the NhRP sought a transfer from a facility designed around the interests of humans to a facility designed around the particular interests of elephants, even if imperfect.
*All views my own. This post is not legal advice.
God Squad Exempts Gulf Oil and Gas Activities from Endangered Species Act Requirements
by Aidan Bodeo-Lomicky, Co-Founder*
April 11, 2026
On March 31, 2026, the Endangered Species Committee (“God Squad”) voted unanimously to exempt all oil and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico from the Endangered Species Act’s requirements. The exemption invoked national security grounds under Section 7(j), a provision that had never been used in the statute's nearly fifty-year history. This unprecedented meeting lasted around fifteen minutes.
No species is more threatened by this decision than the Rice's whale, the only baleen whale living in the Gulf year-round. Scientists estimate that roughly 50 individuals remain, and they are found nowhere else on earth. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster killed roughly 22% of the population, and scientists have warned that losing even a single breeding female could push the species past the point of recovery. NOAA's May 2025 biological opinion found that vessel strikes from Gulf oil and gas operations are likely to jeopardize the Rice's whale's continued existence, implementing vessel speed restrictions as mitigation. Now, the God Squad exemption strips these protections and others from the Rice's whale and over two dozen other endangered and threatened species in the region, including the Gulf sturgeon, Florida manatee, sperm whale, and five species of sea turtle.
God Squad
The God Squad was created by Congress in 1978 to relieve tensions after TVA v. Hill, a case in which the Supreme Court held that the ESA required halting the construction of a dam to protect the snail darter fish, much to the chagrin of industry. The God Squad is made up of six cabinet-level officials (the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and Army, plus the heads of the Council of Economic Advisors, EPA, and NOAA) along with a state representative, and is chaired by the Secretary of the Interior. It has the power to exempt federal actions from Section 7's no-jeopardy requirement, but only after following a demanding process laid out in Section 7(h): a formal application, a threshold determination by the Secretary of the Interior, a formal hearing before an administrative law judge, a secretary's report analyzing alternatives and mitigation, and a supermajority vote (unless the national security justification is used). Any exemption granted must include mitigation measures.
In nearly fifty years, the committee had convened only three times before this: (1) in 1979, it denied an exemption for the Tellico Dam in Tennessee due to the snail darter; (2) the same year, it granted an exemption for the Grayrocks Dam in Wyoming despite the threat to whooping cranes; and (3) in 1992, it granted a partial exemption for BLM timber sales in Oregon that threatened the northern spotted owl, though that exemption was later withdrawn after the Ninth Circuit found that proceedings were tainted by improper White House communications. Only the Grayrocks exemption ever actually took effect.
Section 7(j) provides a separate mechanism. It states that "notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the committee shall grant an exemption for any agency action if the Secretary of Defense finds that such exemption is necessary for reasons of national security." And before March 2026, it had never been invoked.
On March 13, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who is not himself a member of the committee, made this finding. He argued that environmental litigation threatened Gulf oil and gas production and pointed to Iranian attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. There are a few serious problems with this rationale:
No oil or gas permit has been denied because of the ESA in the Gulf.
No oil and gas company or federal agency requested the exemption.
The national security provision was designed for scenarios like active military operations being impeded by species protections, not the speculative possibility that future litigation might disrupt production.
The administration's position is that Section 7(j)'s "notwithstanding" language eliminates every procedural requirement, including the application, hearing, and secretary's report. As Harvard's Environmental and Energy Law Program detailed in its pre-decision analysis, the government argued in court filings that no other provisions of Section 7 apply. This means that none of the "normal" 7(h) steps were followed, no mitigation measures were imposed, and no outside input was taken.
Litigation
Three lawsuits have been filed in D.C.'s federal district court: one by the Center for Biological Diversity, one by NRDC, and one by a coalition of Healthy Gulf, Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and Turtle Island Restoration Network, all represented by Earthjustice. Each suit challenges a different aspect of the meeting and its decision.
The strongest arguments go to the lack of procedure. Section 7(j) dictates the outcome of the committee's vote, but many argue that it does not obviously eliminate the requirements of Section 7(h) (the application, hearing, secretary's report, and mitigation measures). As the Congressional Research Service has suggested, the most natural reading is that the national security exemption guarantees the result but the process still applies. If a court agrees, the God Squad's lack of procedure here makes its decision very likely to be overturned.
Another issue is the vast scope of the exemption. Every prior exemption addressed a discrete project, whereas this one covers an entire industry program across roughly 95 million acres of ocean. And the environmental NGO plaintiffs argue that Hegseth's national security determination is itself reviewable for arbitrariness under the APA, as it rests on the speculative threat of future litigation as opposed to any current operational harm.
MMPA
Some earlier commentary (including our own) suggested that the Marine Mammal Protection Act might independently protect the Rice's whale and other marine mammals even after the ESA God Squad exemption. Unfortunately, a closer reading of the ESA's statutory text does not support this, at least regarding the most important MMPA protections.
ESA Section 7(o) provides that:
Notwithstanding sections 4(d) and 9(a)(1)(B) and (C), sections 101 and 102 of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, or any regulation promulgated to implement any such section—
(1) any action for which an exemption is granted under subsection (h) shall not be considered to be a taking of any endangered species or threatened species with respect to any activity which is necessary to carry out such action; and
(2) any taking that is in compliance with the terms and conditions specified in a written statement provided under subsection (b)(4)(iv) shall not be considered to be a prohibited taking of the species concerned.
Sections 101 and 102 contain the MMPA's core take prohibitions. Other MMPA provisions would theoretically remain intact, but they provide limited practical protections in this context. Of course, if the exemption is ultimately vacated due to the aforementioned litigation, both ESA and MMPA protections would be restored.
Alternatively, because the God Squad technically invoked Section 7(j)'s national security trump card as opposed to the normal 7(h) God Squad procedures, we argue that the above language in 7(o) would not apply ("any action for which an exemption is granted under subsection (h) shall not be considered to be a taking"). This would leave MMPA protections in place, though likely at the expense of ESA protections.
Final Thoughts
For the Rice's whale, survival now depends on the courts. If the exemption is vacated, the ESA and MMPA's protections would immediately return. If not, the Rice's whale faces an industry operating across its entire habitat with no obligation to slow down or otherwise prevent harm. The litigation also determines future protections for many other incredible species in this region.
The decision also sets a dangerous precedent beyond just the Gulf. If the exemption survives, any Secretary of Defense can effectively override the ESA whenever they so choose, turning the God Squad into a rubber stamp for extinction. More actions in the same vein would surely follow.
*All views my own. This post is not legal advice.
Upcoming Publication
April 2, 2026
Exciting news! Co-Founders Aidan Bodeo-Lomicky and Mason Liddell’s latest article has been selected for publication in the Georgetown Environmental Law Review.
The piece examines the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and explores how it could be better used to combat the modern threats facing whales. We look forward to sharing it later this year!
Public Comment
March 26, 2026
Today, Animal Counsel submitted a public comment on NOAA’s proposed incidental take regulations for geophysical surveys in the Gulf, authored by Co-Founder Aidan Bodeo-Lomicky and externs Taryn Lind and Eric Nicholson. They argue that the proposed rule fails to adequately protect the Gulf’s marine mammals as required by the Marine Mammal Protection Act, particularly the Rice’s whale. This species is the most recently discovered and most endangered baleen whale on the planet, with the remaining 50 or so individuals all living in the northern Gulf.
And on Tuesday, 3/31 at 9:30 am ET, for the first time in over thirty years, the Endangered Species Committee (“God Squad”) will be meeting to potentially strip ESA protections from this species and others (more info & livestream link). This would of course be catastrophic for the Rice’s whale, and it makes the protections in NOAA’s proposed MMPA rule all the more important for this species’ survival.
Read our critiques of the proposed rule here: https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NOAA-NMFS-2025-0638-0008.
Spring Extern Spotlight
March 10, 2026
Meet our other awesome spring extern, Eric Nicholson! (pictured here with Co-Founders Mason, Aidan, and Shelby at the 2024 Animal Law Conference)
Law School: University of Colorado Law School (3L)
Hometown: Montgomery, Alabama
Favorite Animal: Emperor penguin
Why Animal Counsel: Animal Counsel offered an experience I was unable to find anywhere else: the opportunity to work on real cases in the animal law and welfare space immediately—whether through legal research, legal writing, or advocacy—and the ability to make steps toward a more equitable non-human animal future.
Public Comment
March 3, 2026
Happy #WorldWildlifeDay!
Last month, Animal Counsel submitted a public comment written by our externs Taryn Lind and Eric Nicholson. They commented on a proposed Conservation Benefit Agreement from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. This nationwide CBA involves eleven bumblebee species, and we suggested a variety of ways to better protect these invaluable animals under the Endangered Species Act.
You can read the comment here: https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FWS-R3-ES-2025-0245-0019
Animal Counsel Opposes the Farm Bill—and You Should Too
by Shelby White, Co-Founder
February 27, 2026
Next week, the House Agriculture Committee will begin marking up the Farm, Food, and National Security Act of 2026 (H.R. 7567)—otherwise known as the latest federal “Farm Bill”—and the future of farming does not look promising. This massive piece of legislation is critical; it shapes how our food system is regulated and funded, how farmed animals and the environment are treated, and, crucially, it has the power to transition American farming to a more humane, sustainable system. But in its current form, it is simply bad. The proposed bill includes language that restricts states’ ability to strengthen animal welfare standards, reinforces subsidies that disproportionately benefit large-scale industrial producers, and shifts certain environmental costs from polluters to taxpayers, while missing the opportunity to invest in ethical food systems and humane farming practices.
One of the Biggest Victories for Farmed Animals Is Under Attack
Perhaps the biggest disappointment in this bill is Section 12006, which prevents states from imposing heightened production standards on agricultural products produced out of state. This provision directly targets and undermines California’s Proposition 12, which established minimum confinement standards for certain farmed animals whose products would be sold in the state. This Farm Bill threatens to override that progress. Prop 12 was monumental—a huge victory for animal welfare advocates. Not only did voters want it but the U.S. Supreme Court held it constitutional. Now, it’s under attack (again). And California won’t be the only state impacted. If Section 12006 becomes law, every state could lose its market power to demand more humane treatment of farmed animals. This provision has to go.
Our Tax Dollars Are Funding a Cruel Industry
The Farm Bill is a huge source of funding for many American farmers and livestock producers who rely on subsidies to get by. Through commodity programs like Price Loss Coverage and Agricultural Risk Coverage, which indirectly prevents products from reflecting their true market price, crop insurance, which supports production of crops used to feed farmed animals an improper diet, and so-called conservation programs like EQIP, which helps animal feeding operations comply with pollution regulations they are legally obligated to comply with, large-scale operations are kept alive while more humane farms (with less acreage and therefore less financial support) are disadvantaged. Billions of taxpayer dollars are spent funding a cruel industry year after year. It is time to start investing in a sustainable future of farming.
Environmental Harm Is Bound to Occur
Not only are concentrated animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”) inhumane, but they are a major source of water and air pollution. Cost-sharing with CAFOs undermines environmental laws, such as the CAA and CWA, by shifting the financial burden of pollution control onto taxpayers, and still causing environmental harm. Cleanup is costly and, oftentimes, damage is irreversible. Our ecosystems are threatened. Our health is threatened. And because CAFOs are disproportionately placed in low-income communities with little means to fight back, environmental justice concerns are heightened. Instead of working to transition away from an extremely harmful industry, the Farm Bill throws more money at it. This bill could be funding smaller farms that better manage waste but instead it chooses profit over sustainability.
Change Is Needed
It’s been over seven years since the last Farm Bill was enacted into law. This legislation will shape agricultural policy for many years to come. We need a new Farm Bill but we need a good one. Our future is at stake. Let the House Agriculture Committee know that changes must be made. Urge them to oppose this bill—especially section 12006. Animals, the environment, farmers, and consumers deserve better.
Make your voice heard: https://agriculture.house.gov/about/committee_members.htm
Law Review Publication
February 26, 2026
Our Co-Founder Mason Liddell just published his latest article in the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review! The article draws on Justice v. Vercher, an Oregon case brought by the Animal Legal Defense Fund, to argue that a similar model of argument could successfully empower nonhuman animals to serve as plaintiffs in Colorado.
Check it out here: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol50/iss1/3/
Seeking Summer Interns! [FILLED]
February 24, 2026
Summer 2026 positions have been filled. If you are interested in a fall 2026 externship, please follow the instructions below:
Now seeking remote summer interns (and terns)! If you're interested in working on real-world animal law and policy issues this summer, please email us your resume, cover letter, and writing sample at contact@animalcounsel.org.
Some of our recent projects include an international whale conservation paper, FOIA requests for captive dolphins, and a public comment on endangered bee habitat regulations. We are excited to work with our interns to develop projects in the areas that interest you most.
Spring Extern Spotlight
February 18, 2026
Meet Taryn Lind, one of our fantastic spring externs!
Law School: Loyola Law School (3L)
Hometown: Greenville, California
Favorite Animal: The Pine Marten. Pine Martens are native to my area, and super adorable. They are also very rare and I've never seen a live one, but I always keep my eyes out for them and hope I'll spot one one day. It's been my favorite animal since I was a child.
Why Animal Counsel: Animal Counsel focuses on the area of environmental law and nature that I most care about, namely, animals. I also love that Animal Counsel is academically focused, which aligns with my long-term interests. And furthermore, Animal Counsel was founded by individuals who are clearly very passionate about animals and environmental protection, and that passion is evidenced in the work that they do and how they came together and started the organization. That passion is contagious, and it makes me excited to join the team and contribute in whatever ways I can.
Denver County is Killing Dogs. Mine Was One of Them.
by Magda Farrug, The Alfie Advocacy Project
January 19, 2026
Alfie came into my life already carrying more than any dog ever should.
Before he was mine, he had survived abuse, neglect, and multiple homes despite his young age. By the time I adopted him on August 5, 2023, he had already learned what it meant to be moved, handled, and given up. Still, when he arrived, he did what dogs so often do: he trusted again.
As a twenty-three-year-old at the time, Alfie was my first dog on my own. From the beginning, he was not just a pet but a presence. He loved stuffed animals and beef jerky. He liked to sit by the window and watch the world go by. He took his responsibilities at the dog park seriously—greeting, circling, making friends. He slept sprawled across my bed until there was barely room left for me, and I gladly adjusted. My apartment became his, and my days became lighter because he was in them. Loving him steadied me. Being his person felt like something I was meant to do.
Less than three months later, a routine walk through the neighborhood turned into a nightmare.
Alfie bit an older woman. She was injured. To this day, I think about her—about the shock of that moment and the pain she experienced. Police and animal control were called. As we waited, I sat with her, trying to keep a respectful distance while also offering comfort in what was a chaotic and frightening situation for everyone involved. She did not want to go to the hospital. I offered to, at least, take her to an urgent care center. Understandably, with the police came an ambulance, and, although the woman objected, EMTs took her to the hospital.
After speaking with animal control, I was allowed to return to my apartment with Alfie. I was told they would follow up after obtaining a statement from the woman who had been injured. Back home, I paced, called Alfie’s trainer, and waited. Animal control returned to my apartment later that day. I was instructed to bring Alfie downstairs. I was told the outcome could go either way. If Alfie was not deemed a dangerous animal, he would be quarantined for ten days for rabies observation—a routine procedure, even for vaccinated dogs—and then released back to me. If he was deemed dangerous, he would be held indefinitely. Animal control signaled that they could have gone with either option but that they were choosing that Alfie would be classified as a dangerous animal. Additionally, I was issued two General Violations: one for animal attack or bite, and another for owning a dangerous animal. Those citations were issued despite no additional evaluation and no behavioral assessment of Alfie’s behavior. Underlying this framework is a strict-liability legal regime. In Denver, as in many jurisdictions, guardians can be held civilly—and in some cases criminally—liable for a bite regardless of intent, context, or prior history. Fault is not required. Mitigating circumstances do not erase liability. Once a bite occurs, responsibility is automatic, and consequences follow even when the situation is complex, disputed, or unforeseeable.
A single determination, made in a matter of moments, reshaped the rest of his life and mine. I was forced to place Alfie into the back compartment of a shelter transport van. The space appeared no more than two feet wide—dark, poorly ventilated, and barely large enough for him to turn around. He was terrified and confused. So was I. I asked the officers if they were taking him straight to the shelter so he could get out as soon as possible. They told me it depended on how many other calls they had.
I still cannot think about that moment without feeling sick. The image of that compartment—small, sealed, and unlit—lodged itself in my mind. It reminded me of a wall crypt in a cemetery. The thought that he might have been kept there for hours is something I will never forget.
Because of my General Violation charges, I had to go through my own process in court. While that case proceeded, Alfie was impounded, and I was required to pay for it. I paid fees for his initial seizure and then ongoing monthly costs for the shelter to continue holding him. These payments were not optional.
If I stopped paying, Alfie would become the shelter’s property, and I would lose any remaining legal standing to advocate for him. At that point, he would face immediate risk of being euthanized, without further process or notice.
This structure created a coercive reality: I was required to fund Alfie’s confinement under conditions I could not change, while decisions about his life were made without independent oversight. My financial obligation did not grant me access, participation, or meaningful influence. It simply prolonged his detention.
For animals, the consequences are even starker. For the next 149 days, Alfie was confined to a small kennel at Denver Animal Shelter under a “do not remove” order. During that time, he did not experience fresh air, exercise, or human touch. He defecated in the same spot that he ate. Despite the shelter’s stated mission of humane care and fostering the human-animal bond, I was never allowed to touch him. I was permitted to see him for fifteen minutes once a week, standing on the other side of metal bars.
Those visits became more distressing than comforting leaving me to contemplate if visiting him was selfish and doing more harm than good for him. Alfie barked continuously, his confusion escalating each time he saw me and could not reach me. Over time, his voice became hoarse. He strained toward the front of the kennel, unable to understand why I would come and then leave without letting him outside or placing a hand on him. I did not understand it either. Throughout Alfie’s confinement, I did not have the right to access records about his health, mental condition, or daily treatment. I was not entitled to medical notes, behavioral observations, or incident reports documenting how he was doing while impounded. Any information I received came indirectly, and only after my attorney formally sought it out. Even then, access was limited and delayed. Despite being required to pay for Alfie’s confinement in order to preserve my legal standing, I had no corresponding right to transparency about his welfare. I was financing his detention without the ability to meaningfully monitor his condition or advocate for his care in real time.
The “do not remove” order that governed Alfie’s confinement was an internal designation, issued by the shelter itself. To my knowledge, it required no independent review, no external oversight, and no publicly articulated standards. Once applied, it functioned as a freeze: Alfie could not be taken outside, exercised, or shown any love or affection regardless of how long the legal process stretched on. The order effectively determined the conditions of his life for months without any formal mechanism for reassessment.
This kind of confinement would raise serious concerns in almost any other context. If a private citizen confined a dog to a small enclosure for months, denied fresh air, exercise, and physical contact, that person could face investigation—or charges—for animal cruelty. When a government shelter imposes the same conditions, it is described as administrative necessity. The distinction rests not on the experience of the animal, but on who is exercising the power.
The absence of oversight matters because “do not remove” orders are not neutral. They shape behavior, deteriorate mental health, and can later be used to justify outcomes by pointing to the very distress they help create. When isolation and deprivation are built into the process, they become framed as evidence of risk rather than recognized as indicators of harm.
That is exactly what happened here. During the pendency of my General Violation case, the city attorney assigned to the matter visited Alfie at the shelter. My own attorney was not permitted to do the same. Afterward, the city attorney, whose background is in law rather than animal behavior, told my counsel that she believed Alfie displayed concerning and aggressive behavior. What those observations failed to acknowledge was the context in which they arose. Alfie had been confined in isolation for nearly half a year—without fresh air, exercise, or physical contact. He was a young, social animal whose world had been reduced to a small kennel and brief, distressing visits through bars. Behavior that is likely to be reasonably expected under those conditions was treated as confirmation of danger, rather than as the predictable consequence of prolonged deprivation.
When a system creates distress and then cites that distress as justification, the conclusion is predetermined. Without independent oversight or meaningful reevaluation, a “do not remove” order does not preserve neutrality; it manufactures the outcome it later claims to observe. Decisions with consequences this severe should not be made internally, indefinitely, and without accountability. The power to confine an animal under such conditions—particularly when alternatives exist—demands scrutiny, standards, and review. Without them, discretion becomes destiny.
In the months that followed, I spoke with trainers and a variety of animal experts and sanctuaries. I learned something that is widely accepted in their fields: dogs do not bite without reason. The reason is not always obvious to humans, especially in moments of stress, fear, or misinterpretation—but it exists. Multiple sanctuaries offered to take Alfie out of state. Trainers volunteered their time. Former foster families spoke up for the dog they knew. Over ten thousand dollars were spent on legal fees. Months were spent fighting in court. Every alternative—every option that would have spared his life—was rejected by the shelter and, in turn, by the city attorney.
Throughout the process, the shelter made substantive decisions about Alfie’s fate. It appeared that the city attorney’s role was not to independently evaluate those decisions, but to defend them. Once the shelter determined that Alfie would not be released, that determination hardened. There was no meaningful adversarial process, no neutral decision-maker weighing alternatives, and no obligation to reconsider. The reason this structure matters is simple: under the law, dogs have no rights. They are classified as property. Legally speaking, Alfie had the same status as an object—not a living being with a heartbeat, a nervous system, or the capacity to suffer. Because he had no legal standing, there was no due process owed to him, only administrative discretion exercised over him.
As a result, decisions about his life were made without the procedural safeguards that typically accompany irreversible state action. The question was never whether Alfie could safely live elsewhere, only whether the shelter would allow it.
Alfie was killed at the shelter before he reached two years old.
After everything else failed, I believed I would at least be allowed to be with him at the end. I was not. Denver Animal Shelter did not allow me to be present when he was killed. Humane treatment was not assumed; it had to be argued for. I had to advocate for him to be sedated first so he could fall asleep, rather than be forcibly restrained, pinned down, and left panicking in the hands of strangers with needles.
He died alone. He likely died afraid. He died without anyone who loved him.
Alfie will never get a second chance. But others still can. The Alfie Advocacy Project exists because what happened to him should not be routine, unexamined, or quietly repeated. Companion animals should not disappear into systems where life-ending decisions are made without transparency, accountability, or meaningful review—especially when viable alternatives exist.
Grief does not always demand consolation. Sometimes it demands action. Alfie mattered. His short life mattered. And I will make sure that his death matters enough to change something.
The Alfie Advocacy Project (AAP) is focused on accountability and structural reform in municipal animal shelters—specifically, the unchecked discretion that allows life-ending decisions to be made internally, without review or meaningful alternatives. AAP was created to advocate for transparency in shelter decision-making, time-limited and reviewable confinement orders, and clear pathways for rescue transfer, rehabilitation, and out-of-state placement when safe options exist. The project also provides support to those harmed by these systems—both the animals subjected to them and the people who love them—while working to raise public awareness about the laws that govern these outcomes, including strict-liability frameworks that can collapse complex situations into irreversible consequences.
ABA Biodiversity Committee Meeting
January 14, 2026
Come join the next ABA Biodiversity Committee meeting on Thursday, January 22 at 5 pm MT/7 pm ET! We will be discussing the past, present, and future of Animal Counsel as well as ways for law students and lawyers to get involved. We hope to see you there!
Meeting link: https://uwyo.zoom.us/j/3077601162?pwd=YUJtbDRYbzdWY0RIdXRpaXNPdWVzQT09&omn=97328313565&from=addon
Giving Tuesday
December 2, 2025
This Giving Tuesday, please consider donating to Animal Counsel.
Your generous donations directly support our work protecting animals and their habitats through the law, including open records requests and academic publishing. And, as a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization, your donation is entirely tax-deductible. Thank you on behalf of the animals!
Animal Law Conference and ALDF Student Convention
November 5, 2025
Animal Counsel Co-Founders Mason Liddell and Aidan Bodeo-Lomicky joined our extern Olivia Villamagna in Chicago last month for the 33rd annual Animal Law Conference! It was wonderful to see so many new and familiar faces, including the Colorado Law Animal Legal Defense Fund and University of San Francisco Student Animal Legal Defense Fund chapters. Mason also presented his USF Law Review article about the slippery slope at the ALDF Student Convention, which you can watch here: https://youtu.be/9_Uugy2M8xc?si=ErlIHS4Ni-6MCxo9&t=7817.
Thanks to the Animal Legal Defense Fund and Lewis & Clark’s Center for Animal Law Studies for hosting such an incredible event year after year!
International Save the Vaquita Day 2025
October 25, 2025
Today is International Save the Vaquita Day 2025!
The vaquita porpoise, found only in the northernmost Gulf of California, Mexico, is one of the world's most endangered animals. Only a dozen remain, and accidental gillnet entanglement continues to threaten their very existence.
Our Co-Founder Aidan Bodeo-Lomicky, who helped start ISTVD back in 2013, spoke about recent conservation efforts on this year's livestream. Check it out below! #SaveTheVaquita
ALDF Student Convention Presentation
October 7, 2025
Our Co-Founder Mason Liddell will be speaking at the 9th Annual Animal Legal Defense Fund Student Convention in Chicago on October 17! He’ll be presenting his recent paper published in the University of San Francisco Law Review about Happy the elephant and Estrellita the monkey. We hope to see you there!
Pictured: Mason speaking at the 8th Annual ALDF Student Convention.
Seeking Spring Externs! [FILLED]
September 26, 2025
Spring 2026 positions have been filled. If you are interested in a summer or fall 2026 externship, please follow the instructions below:
Attention 2Ls and 3Ls! We're seeking spring externs who are passionate about wildlife, domestic animals, and/or rights of nature issues. Externs will have the opportunity to write public comments and FOIA requests, research state-level procedural law, and develop academic articles on wildlife and rights of nature topics. Further, we’re very interested in working with our externs to develop additional projects within these areas. The externship will be part-time and remote.
If interested, please email your resume, cover letter, and a writing sample (as well as any questions you may have) to contact@animalcounsel.org by October 27, 2025. Thank you!
Upcoming Seminar
September 10, 2025
Animal Counsel co-founder Mason Liddell is moderating an upcoming seminar hosted by George Washington Law's Animal Legal Education Initiative. This particular seminar will focus on syllabus construction for an "animal law 101"-type course, but it's part of a larger series on being an adjunct teacher in the field of animal law.
Hope to see you there!
Monmouth University Feature
September 5, 2025
Co-Founder Aidan Bodeo-Lomicky was recently featured in his alma mater Monmouth University's Urban Coast Institute blog, where he discussed Animal Counsel's creation and goals for the future. Check it out here:
Fall Extern Spotlight
September 3, 2025
Meet our other fantastic fall extern, Olivia Villamagna!
Law school: Chicago-Kent College of Law (2L)
Hometown: Largo, FL
Favorite animal: Pigs (specifically Molly Brown at Iowa Farm Sanctuary)
Why Animal Counsel: I chose Animal Counsel for my externship because it lets me advocate for the voiceless alongside dedicated advocates Aidan, Mason, and Shelby. Their encouragement to pursue the topics I’m passionate about, like the intersection of intellectual property and animal law, makes this an inspiring place to learn and contribute to furthering the impact of animal law.
Fall Extern Spotlight
August 27, 2025
Meet one of our awesome fall externs, Bryn Weissman!
Law school: University of San Francisco School of Law (2L)
Hometown: Walnut Creek, CA
Favorite animal: Blue-footed booby (reason: they engage in dancing and gift giving to attract mates which is honestly adorable, plus the color of the feet are direct indicators of their health which I find fascinating)
Why Animal Counsel: The main reason I applied to Animal Counsel is because the work that Shelby, Aidan, and Mason engage in matters. This organization recognizes the societal need for lawyers to advocate on behalf of animals and nature. It is a privilege to start my journey into animal law with the help of Animal Counsel.
Project Spiral Podcast
August 18, 2025
Animal Counsel Co-Founder Aidan Bodeo-Lomicky was recently featured on the Project Spiral podcast! He had the chance to talk about the goals and vision of Animal Counsel, his advocacy for the world’s most endangered marine mammal, the vaquita, and some reasons for optimism during these increasingly challenging times for wildlife. Check it out below:
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VxTOvu1zjMc
Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/6juUUxKV6qgeotH8RnA0BV?si=qmKN8ElXQy2clufiPl6oWg
Seeking Fall Externs! [FILLED]
July 23, 2025
Fall 2025 positions have been filled. If you are interested in a spring 2026 externship, please follow the instructions below:
Calling all 2Ls and 3Ls! We are seeking externs who are passionate about wildlife, domestic animals, and/or rights of nature issues. Externs will have the opportunity to write public comments, research state-level procedural law, and develop academic articles on wildlife and rights of nature topics. Further, because we are such a new organization, we’re very interested in working with our externs to develop additional projects within these areas. The externship will be part-time and remote, and we are hiring on a rolling basis. If interested, please send your resume, cover letter, and a writing sample (as well as any questions you may have) to contact@animalcounsel.org. Thank you!
Official Launch
July 21, 2025
We’re thrilled to officially launch Animal Counsel! Our mission is to ensure that the law goes beyond species to protect all who need it. From statutes with proven success like the Endangered Species Act, to relatively new legal theories like the rights of nature, we hope to keep advancing the interests of animals in Colorado and beyond through law and policy.
Page updated
Google Sites
Report abuse